It is claimed in Phys. Lett. A by T. Nishioka et al. [327 (2004) 28-32] that the security of Y-00 is equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher. In this paper it is shown that the claim is false. The erroneous assertions made in that paper are delineated. The security of Y-00 type protocols in both key generation and direct encryption are clarified.
A new approach to quantum cryptography called KCQ, (keyed communication in quantum noise), has been developed [1] on the basis of a different advantage creation principle from that in either uncorrelated-classical-noise key generation [2] or the well known BB84 quantum protocol [3] . A special case called αη (or Y-00 in Japan) has been experimentally investigated and developed to a considerable extent [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . In Ref. [9] , the claim is made that it is equivalent to a classical stream cipher, i.e., there is no intrinsic quantum feature in the KCQ scheme [10] .
In this paper, we will show that this claim is patently false. The basic advantage creation principle underlying the KCQ approach, namely the difference between the optimal quantum receiver performance with versus without knowledge of a shared secret key, is already indicated in Ref. [4] and elaborated in Ref. [1] . On the other hand, cryptography and especially quantum cryptography is full of subtlety and slippery slopes. In the following, we will try to clarify the main points and relate them to our actual experimental development. The full account will emerge in the future, from further expansion and explanation of Ref. [1] and their experimental correlates. We first review the original experimental scheme αη as described in Ref. [4] and depicted in Fig. 1 . Alice encodes each data bit into a coherent state in a qumode, an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, of the form
where α 0 is real and ℓ ∈ {0, ..., m − 1}. The M states are divided into M/2 basis pairs of antipodal signals {| ± α ℓ } with −α ℓ = α ℓ+M/2 . A seed key K of bit length |K| is used to drive a conventional encryption mechanism whose output is a much longer running key K ′ that is used to determine, for each qumode carrying the bit b{= 0, 1}, which pair {| ± α ℓ } is to be used. Bob utilizes a quantum receiver to decide on b knowing which particular pair {| ± α ℓ } is to be discriminated, in accordance with quantum detection theory [11] . On the other hand, Eve needs to pick a quantum measurement for her attack in the absence of the basis knowledge provided by the seed or running key. The difference in the resulting receiver performance is a quantum effect with no classical analog, and constitutes the ground for possible advantage creation in the scheme. Note that since the measurement noise is irreducible, such advantage creation is unconditionally secure. In contrast, in a classical situation including noise, the simultaneous measurement of the amplitude and phase of the signal, as realized optically by heterodyning, provides the general optimal measurement for both Bob and Eve; thus preventing any advantage creation.
This scheme can be easily extended by modifying the possible signal sets, by introducing additional randomization and/or chaining operations as in conventional cryptography, and by error-control coding with deliberate introduction of some errors by Alice which are correctable by Bob. These extensions are all in accord with the philosophy and principles underlying KCQ, and have been described in Ref. [1] .
One needs to first distinguish the use of such a scheme for key generation versus data encryption. It may first appear that if the system is secure for data encryption, it would also be secure for key generation if the data are subsequently used as keys. This is indeed the view taken in Ref. [12] , and it is the main conclusion of Ref. [9] that such key generation is impossible. It is unfortunate that the author of Ref. [12] , a co-author of Refs. [4, 5] , made his conclusion in [12] over our objection that the direct encryption experiments in [4, 5] would already allow for key generation. In fact, for the direct encryption experiments in Refs. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] , we have only claimed complexity-based security against general attacks, with "unconditional security" only against a very limited class of "individual attacks." However, we emphasize that unconditional security against general attacks for either key generation or direct encryption is possible by extensions of the original scheme as described in Ref. [1] .
The situation may be delineated as follows. Consider first key generation via random data picked by Alice. Let X n , Y E n , Y B n be the classical random vectors describing the bit data of length n, Eve's observation, and Bob's observation. For the purpose of bounding Eve's performance, Eve is granted one copy of the quantum signal, which would be identical to Bob's for an ideal channel. She may make any quantum measurement to obtain Y E n in her attack, without knowing the secret key K-we restrict ourselves to this case addressed in Ref. [9] while more general possibilities are discussed in Ref. [1] . Note that for either attack on X n or on K, Eve can only make one such measurement to cover all possible X n 's and K's. Thus, Y E n would be different and inferior to Y B n for the purpose of deciphering X n or K. In the case of classical cipher (without uncorrelated noise for Eve and Bob), Y E n = Y B n = Y n . Thus, with H being the entropy function, the Shannon limit [13] H(X n |Y n ) ≤ H(K)
applies and there can be no fresh key generated. This is because all the uncertainty in X n is derived from K, however long n is.
In spite of the rather torturous attack described in Ref. [9] , their main conclusion can be simply summarized in the following assertion on αη,
which corresponds to the crucial assertion following their Eq. (11) that the inner "product is extremely small." From (3) with ∼ replaced by =, which is what their analysis amounts to, one obtains (2) for Y n = Y E n . Thus, without any further ado one may conclude that "the security of Y-00 protocol is equivalent to that of a classical stream cipher," and no key generation is possible as a consequence.
The error, of course, lies in the taking ∼ to be = in (3) even if (3) holds. This replacement cannot be exactly correct precisely because of the coherent-state quantum noise. Advantage creation is obtained whenever
which is a straightforward generalization of the condition in Ref. [2] in the presence of a shared secret key K. Note that in (4), Y E n is obtained in the present case from a quantum measurement on the quantum signal without the knowledge of K, as discussed above. It is then used together with any value of K to estimate the data X n . The condition (4) can never be satisfied when ∼ in (3) is taken to be =, since H is non-negative. However, key generation is in principle possible under both (3) and (4).
To illuminate this possibility, consider the case where Eve makes the same measurement on each qumode described in Ref. [9] , i.e., an "individual attack" scenario. With S ≡ |α 0 | 2 being the average photon number in the states (1), the bit-error rate for Bob with the optimum quantum receiver is [11] 
whereas the bit-error rate for heterodyning used in Ref. [9] is the well known Gaussian result
and that for the optimum-phase measurement tailored to the states in (1) is
over a wide range of S. Ideal quantum-limited detection is assumed in obtaining (5)- (7) . With a mesoscopic signal level S ∼ 10, one has P b ∼ 10 −12 , P het b ∼ 10 −3 , P ph b ∼ 10 −6 . If the data arrives at a rate of 1 Gbps, Bob is likely to have 10 9 error-free bits in 1 second, while Eve would have ∼ 10 6 or ∼ 10 3 errors in her 10 9 bits with heterodyne or the optimum-phase measurement that has no known experimental realization. With the usual privacy amplification [14] , the users can then generate ∼ 10 6 or ∼ 10 3 bits in the 1-sec interval by eliminating Eve's information. There are numerous possibilities and considerations on the use of αη and its extensions for key generation in a realistic environment within the KCQ framework. In particular, Alice's use of deliberate signal randomization (DSR) to move the states closer to the decision boundary for Bob could lead to security against attacks on the key, and to improved key-generation rate. These considerations are already described in Ref. [1] . However, the above illustration should suffice in demonstrating the basic incorrectness of the claim that αη is classical.
Moving on to direct encryption, it is clear that under (3) with ∼ replaced by =, the Shannon limit (2) holds for Y n = Y E n . Thus, the security is far from the perfect H(X n |Y n ) = H(X n ) or the "unconditional" or near-perfect H(X n |Y n ) ∼ H(X n ), even just under ciphertext-only attacks described by these entropic quantities. However, this is usually not considered a problem in conventional cryptography because even under (2), presumably many bits of X n are in error from an estimate based only on Y n . The problem is usually considered to be one of known-plaintext attack, in which Eve tries to determine the key K from known (X n , Y n ) pairs from the cipher. There are no known rigorous results on these two classes of problems in conventional cryptography except the ones based on complexity assumptions. The situation is more favorable in our KCQ approach, as described partly in Ref. [1] . Since they were not raised in Ref. [9] , we will not discuss them here except in comparison with BB84 that Ref. [9] alludes to.
Recently, many proposals have been made on the use of AES [15] for direct encryption in conjunction with BB84 for key generation. This is because the use of one-time pad for direct encryption with key generated via BB84 would be extremely inefficient. In such a case, the data security is reduced to that of AES, which not only does not have any theoretically proven security, but which also does not have the security potential of αη, not to mention what we call CPPM (coherent pulse-position modulation), another KCQ scheme described in Ref. [1] . The potential of αη in direct encryption lies in the same advantage-creation principle as in key generation. Under (4), the Shannon limit (2) no longer applies since it is possible that
with H(X n |Y E n , K) > 0. Intuitively, this is clear because a decryption error corresponding to a positive H(X n |Y E n , K) would lead to a higher H(X n |Y E n ) than H(K) that is obtained from perfect decryption.
Even together with one-time pads, BB84 key generation also suffers from known-plaintext attacks on its future use that has not been analyzed in the literature. This attack may involve learning part of the key obtained from a known-plaintext attack on its use on future data, which is then combined with Eve's original probe or even just her measurement result in conjunction with her side information to yield further information on the rest of the key.
A complete quantitative analysis for both KCQ and BB84 against all such attacks remains to be carried out.
As explicitly stated in Refs. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] on experimental direct encryption, the only security claimed thus far against a general attack is that of complexitybased one. In particular, the αη scheme of Fig. 1 adds one additional layer of search to any conventional cipher represented by the encryption box. In this way of looking at the scheme, we have a classical cipher in noise induced by quantum effects, which may however be also of classical origin and indeed be induced by high-speed deliberate randomization from Alice. The key-search complexity is, in the brute-force case, approximately
with λ = 2 for ciphertext-only attacks and λ = 1 for known-plaintext attacks. Condition (9) is derived under the assumption that (3) is obtained with ∼ replaced by =, as made in Ref. [9] . Numerically, (9) is ≥ 2 600 using our experimental parameters of M ∼ 4 × 10 3 , α 0 ∼ 2 × 10 2 , |K| ∼ 4.4 × 10 3 [8] , and is thus beyond any conceivable classical or quantum search capability available today.
The other erroneous claims in Ref. [9] are briefly summarized:
It is not true that having S photons per pulse in αη would increase the bit rate by a factor of S compared to single-photon systems. This involves a confusion of signal energy with date rate. The actual performance is a function of the other system parameters including loss, device noise, and system bandwidth.
It is not true that αη requires a nearly ideal quantum channel. In fact, one major advantage of αη is its insensitivity to channel noise, due to its use of larger energy signals in a binary detection mode as in unencrypted fiber telecom. The channel noise fluctuation may cause a problem to Eve, but would not be significant enough to move the signal to the opposite decision region in our experiments.
Another major advantage of αη is that with the final key verification process [1] for key generation or the message authentication necessary for data integrity in any cryptosystem, there is no need to even detect Eve's presence separately, not to mention monitoring her level of intrusion. In any event, it is not true that signal amplification is impossible even if Eve's activities need to be detected. This is because the error from amplification is within well-defined limits that Eve's activities may cause to exceed.
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